

**BRISTOL BAY
SUBAREA CONTINGENCY PLAN**

**SCENARIOS
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SCENARIOS: PART ONE - WORST CASE DISCHARGE

Situation. The M/V Kangho, a floating seafood processor, is offshore and enroute to Nushagak Bay in preparation for the upcoming commercial salmon season. For unknown reasons, the vessel suffers a fire in the engine room and loses propulsion and rudder control. Prevailing winds and marginal sea conditions drive the vessel aground at Protection Point on the eastern shore of Cape Constantine. The fire burns uncontrolled for over a day and the force of the grounding compromises the hull, resulting in a release of heavy fuel oil. The crew abandoned ship and was rescued by a Coast Guard helicopter.

Location: Nushagak Bay, N58-30' / W158-45'

Spill Information: There is a steady release of heavy fuel oil (4,000 gals/day) for the first two days, then a slower release of 1,000 gallons/day for the next several days. The vessel was carrying a total of 140,000 gallons heavy fuel oil, 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel and other lube oils, and also has unknown quantities of anhydrous ammonia gas and chlorine gas to support fish processing. The released oil is moving with the tide and prevailing winds, and has impacted the western shoreline of Nushagak Bay.

Cargo Salvage: The ship is determined to be salvageable, although lightering cannot be accomplished due to the fire and general instability of the ship, and until response crews determine that the ammonia refrigeration system and chlorine system are intact.

Sensitive Areas at Risk: According to the ADF&G Alaska Habitat Management Guide and Map Atlas for the Southwest Region (1985) and ADF&G Most Environmentally Sensitive Area (MESA) Map 19 (June 1997), the following species are known to exist in the immediate area:

- Harbor/Spotted Seal (Protection Point and nearby Nichols Spit are known seal haulout concentration locations; the southern end of Cape Constantine is also a known seal haulout area)
- Igushik River, Tununing River, Weary River, Nushagak River, Snake River, and Squaw Creek (anadromous streams to the immediate north of the accident site)
- Waterfowl (Protection Point and nearby Nichols Spit are known waterfowl Spring and Fall concentration areas, as well as the Igushik River, Weary River, and Snake River; remaining area is a known general distribution location for ducks, geese, and tundra swans, with known Spring seasonal concentrations of geese in the Igushik River area)
- Belukha Whales (known belukha whale calving and feeding concentration area)
- Beavers (known general distribution in the impacted area)
- Brown Bears (known general distribution in the impacted area)
- Caribou (general distribution area is the eastern end of Nushagak Bay)
- Moose (general distribution area is the mouth of the Igushik River and all points north of the river, as well as the eastern shoreline area of Nushagak Bay)

- Groundfish and Pacific Herring (known migration routes are to the immediate south of Cape Constantine, and to the immediate east of Protection Point)
- Red King Crab (general distribution includes the mid and outer portions of Nushagak Bay)
- Areas of Subsistence Use (the communities of Dillingham, Portage Creek, Clarks Point, Aleknagik, Manokotak, Togiak, and Twin Hills all use the general area for subsistence use for salmon, marine fish, marine invertebrates, freshwater fish, marine mammals, waterfowl, trapping, and vegetation)

Date: Late May

Weather: Overcast, Temp: 52F, Wind: Easterly 35 Knots, Visibility: 3 miles.

Notifications. The Vessel Captain issues an SOS immediately after discovering the fire in the engine room. Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, the Dillingham Harbormaster, and MSO Anchorage receive the distress call. MSO Anchorage notifies ADEC and other federal agencies. Once notified, ADEC begins to notify other state agencies (ADNR, ADF&G, DES).

The vessel owner contacts the Coast Guard and ADEC and requests any and all assistance with the response effort. MSO Anchorage personnel advise the ship owner's representative of the legal responsibilities for spill response. The Unified Command agrees to activate Coast Guard BOA contracts with CISPRI and Chadux, and also activate the Pacific Strike Team and request their assistance with the response.

Initial Response Actions. All initial command functions and communications will originate from the MSO Anchorage command center. A Unified Command is formed, consisting of the FOSC, SOSC and RPOSC (ship owner's representative via teleconference).

MSO Anchorage requests immediate transportation via USCG C-130 or commercial charter aircraft to set up a forward command post at the scene. The exact location will be determined once Federal/State spill response staff arrive on-scene.

Within ADEC, response personnel communicate with natural resource trustee agency leadership to identify response priorities for booming and containment.

ADEC mobilizes primary spill response personnel from Anchorage and they, along with Coast Guard personnel, await immediate dispatch to the scene to provide on-scene information on the spill.

Command Center Establishment. The command center will be activated in Anchorage, with plans to move the command center to Dillingham. The local Harbormaster's office or another suitable facility in Dillingham will be considered as the initial site for the forward

command post. The use of a Coast Guard cutter as a forward operating command post is also discussed.

Initial response personnel, consisting of MSO Anchorage and DEC personnel, agree that it is a priority to establish a communications link between the forward command post and the command center as early as possible. This is initially accomplished by using cellular phones and telephones in the local area.

ICS Mobilization. The Incident Management Team (IMT) begins to form as additional personnel respond to the initial command center. Agency involvement is still limited primarily to ADEC and the USCG. State and Federal resource agencies begin to work on identifying sensitive areas in the immediate area.

The Coast Guard Air Station in Kodiak dispatches a C-130 to Anchorage to transport USCG and ADEC personnel to the scene. Several staff members remain in Anchorage to continue manning the initial command center.

The FOSC mobilizes members of the Pacific Strike Team from California with spill response and Hazmat response equipment. The strike team responds with approximately 6 people, and they will arrive on-scene with most of the necessary equipment and resources to conduct all vessel response operations. The strike team will arrive in their own C-130 aircraft at Dillingham Airport.

Staging Areas. The local airport at Dillingham is designated as the primary staging area for response equipment. An equipment check-in point is established at the staging area to track equipment and staffed with USCG and ADEC personnel. The FOSC and SOSC coordinate with local community leaders in Dillingham and adjoining communities and inform the individuals of on-going containment and cleanup actions.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. The FOSC recognizes that the RP may have limited resources to respond to the spill and initiates actions to augment the RP's response. The SOSC also initiates actions to augment the response. The State has pre-deployed spill response assets located in a conex container at Dillingham, and maintains community spill response agreements with Dillingham, Naknek and the Bristol Bay Borough. The State also provides the RP with a list of trained responders that may be hired to assist with the response and shoreline cleanup effort.

On-Scene Response. During the initial hours following the spill, the Dillingham Harbormaster and fire chief are the initial responders on-scene. No other state or federal agencies have arrived on scene yet. The Coast Guard has dispatched an air rescue helicopter and diverted a 378 cutter to the accident scene.

USCG personnel request that the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator develop a spill trajectory. Although the amount of spilled oil is still uncertain and weather conditions are dynamic, a reasonable trajectory is completed

Local emergency response personnel provide assistance with setting up the forward command post in Dillingham and provide logistical support, office space, communications equipment, and other locally available resources.

A public information center is also established in Dillingham to address public concerns. The Coast Guard and State also activate Public Affairs staff who begin to work on public outreach and coordinate media coverage. During the first few days of the response, several different public information outlets may be established. However, as the ICS forms, a joint information center with federal, state and local public affairs representatives will be formed. As early as possible, the Public Information Officer(s) will work with communications and computer experts to establish an internet site to keep the public up-to-date on response activities, spill trajectory, and other situation specifics. A Unified Command web site (similar to that established during the M/V KUROSHIMA spill) is established to keep the general public and home offices informed of the situation.

ADEC personnel formulate the initial SITREP, which is the situation report sent by ADEC to the other state resource agencies, federal agencies, and Juneau ADEC office, summarizing state actions so far. The ADEC public information office in Juneau uses the SITREP to develop an initial press release. The Coast Guard also generates a POLREP, which is also a situation report, for essentially the same purposes as ADEC's SITREP.

Early in the response, the Unified Command discusses the need to hire a historic properties specialist to advise them of any important historical sites in the general vicinity of the spill that should be considered for protection, if possible. The Unified Command also approves contacting wildlife response organizations and other specialists in the event wildlife are impacted by the spill.

The initial ADEC team brings a "crash kit" of office and planning supplies, laptop computers, and other office equipment into Dillingham. They also bring their own PPE, mustang suits, etc. The limited support equipment is used to set up the forward command post, and oil spill response equipment is stored at the staging area overnight. Equipment transport is prioritized according to the needs on-scene, with operational equipment such as boom, anchors and PPE prioritized over other support equipment. Coast Guard and private aircraft, helicopters, and privately contracted vessels are also used to transport equipment to the scene.

As the response proceeds, additional personnel begin to arrive on-scene and the ICS continues to expand. An initial incident action plan has been developed by the Unified Command.

The Kodiak USCG air station continues to provide the primary logistics support for transporting and staging equipment.

Crews have begun to stage boom and other equipment at certain key shoreline locations to further prevent oiling of the shoreline. Oil-impacted shorelines will also be assessed by SCAT Teams prior to dispatching shoreline cleanup crews.

Communications. Telephone communications from Dillingham to Anchorage, and ship to shore communications from the on-scene Coast Guard Cutter remain the primary means of field communications. It will take a few days for a communications system to support the on-scene response to evolve. VHF radios, supported by portable repeater systems are explored as an optional field communications capability.

Sensitive Areas Identification and Protection. Based on the initial spill trajectory developed by NOAA, the spill impacts the western shore of Nushagak Bay, and is swinging north and south, depending on tidal fluctuations. During the first 72 hours, shoreline protection strategies are focused on protective booming of sensitive areas (as identified by sensitive areas maps and Natural Resource Agency Trustees.) The Marine Wildlife Rescue Team is activated to provide hazing and wildlife recovery as appropriate.

As soon as it is apparent that oil is in the water, The Natural Resource Trustee Agencies consult with local community contacts regarding sensitive area protection priorities.

Following the spill, USFWS requests assistance in surveying the area to determine if any wildlife have been oiled.

In recommending sensitive areas for protection, the local government and resource agencies use the prioritization scheme in the Sensitive Areas section of the Bristol Bay SCP, balancing natural resource population information with human use and subsistence considerations. Local residents and the local government provide input on human use, recreation, and subsistence areas.

The resource trustees and local representatives determine that the most effective use of boom would be to deploy exclusionary and deflective boom at all of the anadromous streams downstream from the spill site. In addition to providing salmon habitat, these streams are identified as sensitive areas due to their recreational and subsistence use.

Wildlife Protection and Response. ADEC and the FOSC have both notified the appropriate Natural Resource Trustee Agencies. USFWS, ADNR, NMFS and ADFG wildlife experts arrive at the command center with other ADEC personnel.

Local residents arriving on-scene (via private vessels) anxious to assist with wildlife protection and rescue, are directed through the planning section (volunteer coordinator) to the contracted wildlife response groups. Volunteers are dissuaded from interfering with ongoing wildlife response operations.

Wildlife responders arrive on-scene with hazing kits and other support equipment. The logistics section works with wildlife responders to identify potential locations for wildlife collection, cleaning and rehab stations and the Unified Command begins to direct the development of a disposal plan for any dead wildlife.

Sensitive areas are identified and prioritized for protection. Wildlife responders consider the viability of hazing threatened wildlife populations. This decision is made on a site-by-site basis, contingent upon a variety of considerations and supported by the necessary permits. The major

priorities for wildlife responders continue to be capturing and treating injured wildlife and collecting carcasses before they can be consumed by other animals.

Clean up and Recovery. As people arrive on scene and boom deployment is accomplished, the focus of the response will begin to switch from protection to oil removal and recovery. The Pacific Strike Team board the vessel and confirm that the ammonia and chlorine systems are intact. Remaining fuel is also lightered off of the vessel.

After the initial influx of boom and other initial response equipment, storage equipment is transported to the scene. Temporary storage bladders are transported to the scene, and a barge with a storage capacity of over 100,000 gallons, is contracted by the RP and dispatched to the scene. Recovery concerns will include protecting resources and further cleanup of impacted shoreline.

Disposal will also become an issue. Oily wastes and debris are transported to the staging area for subsequent disposition.

The Responsible Party contracts with a salvage company to begin salvage operations.

Personnel Considerations. Initially, lodging and food will be obtained in Dillingham.

SCENARIOS: PART TWO - MAXIMUM MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE

Situation: The T/B Jeta, a 65-foot fuel barge, is on its way up the Nushagak River to deliver fuel to local communities. While offloading diesel fuel at Ekwok, the transfer hose connection on the dock fails. The barge tankerman stops the transfer after the shoreside person frantically informs him of the hose failure. Approximately 1,500 gallons of fuel is spilled as both ends of the hose line empty their contents, before the appropriate valves are shut off.

Location: Ekwok, approximate latitude/longitude N59-25' / W157-30'

Spill Information: The barge is carrying a total of 50,000 gallons evenly distributed among four cargo tanks. The tow vessel is standing by up river from the spill. Released fuel spreads rapidly due to river state and is already soiling the shoreline on both sides of the river. Ekwok was the second stop on the fuel delivery route.

Sensitive areas at risk: According to the ADF&G Alaska Habitat Management Guide for the Southwest Region (1985), the following species are known to exist in the immediate area:

- Anadromous stream (Nushagak River)
- Rainbow trout and grayling also in river
- Waterfowl (general distribution location for ducks, tundra swans, and geese, with known Fall concentrations of ducks at an area downstream along the Kokwok River)
- Beavers (known high density in the impacted area)
- Brown Bears (known general distribution in the impacted area)
- Caribou (known Winter use area)
- Moose (known calving and rutting concentration areas, known general distribution area)
- Areas of Subsistence Use (the communities of Ekwok, New Stuyahok, Portage Creek, Koliganek, Clarks Point, Aleknagik, Dillingham, Manokotak, Togiak, and Twin Hills all use the general area for subsistence use for moose, vegetation, freshwater fish, caribou, salmon, and trapping)

Date: June

On-Scene Weather: Temp: 54F, Wind: S 7 knots, overcast with intermittent rain

Notifications. MSO Anchorage receives the initial notification and an initial command center is activated in Anchorage. Plans to move the command center to Dillingham are discussed. MSO Anchorage notifies ADEC and federal stakeholders. Once notified, ADEC begins to notify other state agencies (ADNR, ADF&G, DES).

Initial Response Actions. The RP is a member of a spill coop and the coop is also activated and mobilizes equipment and personnel to the scene.

MSO Anchorage requests immediate transportation via USCG C-130 or commercial charter aircraft to set up a forward command post at the scene. The exact location will be determined once the MSO party arrives on-scene.

Within ADEC, response personnel communicate with natural resource trustee agency leadership to identify response priorities for booming and containment.

Once on scene, MSO Anchorage and ADEC response personnel advise the vessel owner of the legal responsibilities for spill response, and instruct the vessel master and the local community tank owner to sound their tanks to determine how much oil has been released.

Command Center Establishment. The Incident Command will start to form in Anchorage, with plans to move the command center to Dillingham if the situation warrants.

Initial response personnel, consisting of MSO Anchorage and DEC personnel, agree that it is a priority to establish a communications link between the forward command post in Dillingham and the command center in Anchorage as early as possible. This is initially accomplished by using telephones in the local area.

ICS Mobilization. The Incident Management Team (IMT) begins to form as additional personnel respond to the initial command center. Agency involvement is still limited primarily to ADEC and the USCG. State and Federal resource agencies begin to work on identifying sensitive areas in the immediate area.

The Coast Guard Air Station in Kodiak dispatches a C-130 to Anchorage to transport USCG and ADEC personnel to the scene. Several staff members remain in Anchorage to continue manning the initial command center.

The FOSC begins mobilizing members of the Pacific Strike Team from California with spill response equipment. The strike team responds with approximately 6 people, and they will arrive on-scene with most of the necessary equipment and resources to conduct all vessel lightering operations. The strike team will arrive in their own C-130 aircraft.

Staging Areas. The local, State-owned airport at Ekwok is designated as the forward staging area for response equipment. The airport at Dillingham is established as the main staging area, and an equipment check-in point is established to track equipment and staffed with USCG and ADEC personnel. The FOSC and SOSC coordinate with the local community leaders at Ekwok and communities downstream and inform the individuals of on-going containment and cleanup actions.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. The FOSC and SOSC recognize that the RP has adequate resources to respond to the spill, but take precautionary actions to augment the

RP's response. The State has pre-deployed spill response assets located in conex containers at Dillingham and Iliamna, and maintains community spill response agreements with Dillingham, Naknek and the Bristol Bay Borough. The State also provides the RP with a list of trained responders that may be hired to assist with the response and shoreline cleanup effort.

On-Scene Response.

Local emergency response personnel provide assistance with setting up the command center in Dillingham by providing logistical support, office space, communications equipment, and other locally available resources.

A public information center is also established in town to address public concerns. The Coast Guard and State also activate Public Affairs staff who begin to work on public outreach and coordinate media coverage. During the first few days of the response, several different public information outlets may be established. However, as the ICS forms, a joint information center with federal, state and local public affairs representatives will be formed. As early as possible, the Public Information Officer(s) will work with communications and computer experts to establish an internet site to keep the public up-to-date on response activities, spill trajectory, and other situation specifics. The Unified Command web site established during the M/V KUROSHIMA spill was considered to be a public relations success and would be used as a model for future medium to large sized spills in the Bristol Bay Subarea.

ADEC personnel begin to formulate a SITREP, which is the situation report sent by ADEC to the other state resource agencies, federal agencies, and Juneau ADEC office, summarizing state actions so far. The ADEC public information office in Juneau uses the SITREP to develop an initial press release. The Coast Guard will generate a POLREP, which is also a situation report, for essentially the same purposes as ADEC's SITREP.

Early in the response, the Responsible Party contracts with an archaeologist, because of the potential of important historical sites in the general vicinity of the spill. The Responsible Party also contacts wildlife response organizations and other specialists in the event wildlife are impacted by the spill.

The initial ADEC team brings a "crash kit" of office and planning supplies, laptop computers, and other office equipment, and they also bring their own PPE, mustang suits, etc. The limited support equipment is used to set up a forward command post, and oil spill response equipment is stored at the staging area overnight. Equipment transport is prioritized according to the needs on-scene, with operational equipment such as boom, anchors and PPE prioritized over other support equipment. Coast Guard and privately contracted vessels are also used to transport equipment to the scene.

As the response proceeds, additional personnel begin to arrive on-scene and the ICS continues to expand. An initial incident action plan has been developed by the RP.

The Kodiak USCG air station continues to provide the primary logistics support for transporting and staging equipment.

If local residents volunteer to assist with wildlife protection and rescue, they are directed through the planning section (volunteer coordinator) to the contracted wildlife response groups. Volunteers are dissuaded from interfering with ongoing wildlife response operations.

Wildlife responders arrive on-scene with hazing kits and other support equipment. The logistics section works with wildlife responders to identify potential locations for wildlife collection, cleaning and rehab stations and the Incident Commander begins to direct the development of a disposal plan for any dead wildlife.

Wildlife responders consider the viability of hazing threatened wildlife populations. This decision is made on a site-by-site basis, contingent upon a variety of considerations and supported by the necessary permits. The major priorities for wildlife responders continue to be capturing and treating injured wildlife and collecting carcasses before they can be consumed by other animals.

Sensitive Areas Identification and Protection. As soon as it is apparent that oil is in the water, the Natural Resource Trustee Agencies consult with local community contacts regarding sensitive area protection priorities.

In recommending sensitive areas for protection, the local government and resource agencies use the prioritization scheme in the Sensitive Areas section of the Bristol Bay SCP, balancing natural resource population information with human use and subsistence considerations. Local residents and the local government provide input on human use, recreation, and subsistence areas.

The resource trustees and local representatives determine that the most effective use of boom would be to deploy exclusionary and deflective boom at all the major sensitive areas downstream from the spill site.

Clean up and Recovery. As people arrive on scene and boom deployment is accomplished, the focus of the response will begin to switch from protection to oil removal and recovery. After the initial influx of containment boom and other initial response equipment, storage equipment is transported to the scene. Temporary storage bladders are transported into the scene, and an additional barge with a storage capacity of over 50,000 gallons, is provided by the RP and dispatched to the scene. Recovery concerns will include protecting resources

Disposal will also become an issue. Oily wastes, debris and recovered fuel are transported to the staging area for subsequent disposition.

Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Teams are organized and deployed to assess shoreline impacts and make recommendations regarding additional cleanup.

Personnel Considerations. Initially, lodging and food are obtained in Dillingham.

SCENARIOS: PART THREE – AVERAGE MOST PROBABLE DISCHARGE

Situation: A storage tank in a remote village along the river has a leak in their piping system. Subsequently, through the winter, they have lost 4,000 gallons of heating oil.

Location: Carter, 59-50' N/ 156-30' W.

Spill information: The oil entered the soil and has migrated into a nearby culvert, adjacent to the river. There is a visible sheen on the standing water in the culvert which remains constant. Oil is coating the sides of the culvert.

Cargo Salvage: The storage tanks still have 3,000 gallons of product in them. There is no isolation valves between the tanks and the leaking pipeline.

Sensitive areas at risk: Refer to the ADF&G Alaska Habitat Management Guide for the Southwest Region (1985), for the species known to exist in the immediate area:

Date: April

On Scene weather: Temp: mid 30's, overcast with snow showers, winds: SE at 20 knots.

Notifications. The EPA FOSC is notified of the situation and notifies ADEC and the Federal agencies. ADEC notifies other state agencies. Because it is a relatively small spill of non-persistent oil, it is determined that the initial response team will be limited to an ADEC field representative and the EPA contractor representative.

Initial Response Actions. The primary spill responders in Anchorage gather basic equipment and depart for the scene via commercial air.

The FOSC and SOSC notify the Responsible Party of their responsibilities to contain and remove the spill, and informs them that, unless they launch an aggressive response, the State/Federal government may initiate cleanup actions and then bill them for the clean up.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. In considering the size and type of spill and the resources at risk, the FOSC representative (in consultation with ADEC and local community) determines that the primary objective of the response is to stop the release of oil and prevent any further releases from entering the culvert and reaching the nearby water body.

Because the spill is moderate in size and the Responsible Parties' resources are finite, response equipment is limited to that which is located in Carter or at Dillingham or Iliamna where ADEC response resources are located.

First, boom (and sorbents) are deployed to contain and absorb spilled product. Only hazwoper-trained individuals may deploy boom, and individuals must have a minimal level of hazardous materials training. The Unified Command will ensure that only properly trained individuals engage in boom deployment. ADEC maintains a list of trained and qualified individuals in the local and regional area.

Wildlife and Sensitive Areas Protection. Local protection priorities in Carter include: The shoreline and tundra along the riverbank and small tributaries have been identified by the local community as a protection priority, and this area is also considered to be important wildlife habitat by USFWS.

The FOSC representative requests that an archaeologist be contacted to consult on protecting nearby cultural and historical sites.

In the days following the spill, USFWS will contact the EPA FOSC and ADEC SOSC to determine whether any wildlife has been oiled.

Clean Up and Recovery. Collected oil is left in the booms until it evaporates or dissipates. Any oiled sorbent materials are collected by the EPA contractor representative and properly disposed of.

SCENARIOS: PART FOUR – HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE

Situation: A seafood facility in Naknek sustains an ammonia release due to a valve failure. Approximately 1,500 pounds of anhydrous ammonia is released from the facility and threatens the local community.

Location: Naknek, 58°43.97'N 157°01.20'W.

Release Information: The ammonia cloud exits the facility and proceeds to move downwind towards the populated area of Naknek.

Sensitive areas at risk: General population at Naknek.

Date/Time: May - 8:30 am.

On Scene weather: Temp: mid 30's, overcast with light rain, winds: westerly at 15 knots.

Notifications. The ADEC is notified of the situation by the Bristol Bay Borough emergency services personnel. The ADEC notifies the Coast Guard (MSO Anchorage) FOSC of the situation. They proceed with notifying other Federal agencies. ADEC notifies other state agencies. Because the release poses a life-threatening situation, the ADEC activates the Statewide Hazmat Response Team in both Fairbanks and Anchorage, and also places an ADEC term contractor on alert. The Coast Guard FOSC may have EPA activate their contractor as well to provide technical support to the team. The Ammonia Group is also placed on alert and requested to provide any additional technical assistance. The initial response team will be composed of an ADEC representative, the Coast Guard FOSC, a member from EPA and a contractor representative, a member of the Statewide Hazmat Response Team, and possibly a member of the Ammonia Group. The follow-on team will consist of members of the Statewide Hazmat Response Team and other support personnel.

Initial Response Actions. The initial response team in Anchorage gathers basic equipment and departs for the scene via commercial or charter air, whichever is most expedient.

The FOSC and SOSC notify the facility owner of their responsibilities to contain and control the release. The Responsible Party indicates that the facility's response capability is extremely limited and they will not be able to re-enter the facility to control the source. The State and Federal OSCs reach an agreement with the Responsible Party and borough emergency response officials to take whatever measures necessary to respond to the release.

Equipment Mobilization and Deployment. The follow-on Statewide Hazmat Response Team has marshaled their team and equipment in Anchorage and are ready to deploy via charter aircraft to King Salmon. Estimated time of arrival of the team is anticipated to be sometime in the early afternoon.

Public Protection. Local protection priorities in Naknek include: Ensure protection of the general public through sheltering in-place or evacuation to a safe location

Response Actions. Local emergency response officials immediately notify the local populace to shelter in-place if possible. Detailed shelter in-place instructions are provided over the radio and public address system. If evacuation becomes necessary, local officials have determined an appropriate process for evacuating the general public via a safe route to a pre-determined area.

Upon arrival of the initial response team, emergency response personnel in proper PPE and equipped with ammonia detectors are tasked to deploy and monitor readings downwind from the release.

The Ammonia Group technical advisor reviews the plant schematics with the plant manager, and attempts to determine the approximate location of the release source. An entry plan is developed prior to the arrival of the Statewide Hazmat Response Team.

Upon arrival of the team, a three-stage entry process is determined to be the best approach. The first entry will be to ventilate the facility using portable, positive pressure ventilation fans. The second entry team will determine the location of the release source, and the third team will secure the source by closing off upstream valves.

Personnel who may have been exposed to the ammonia vapors will be treated locally or airlifted to the nearest hospital, depending on the nature of their injuries.

Clean Up and Recovery. Upon securing the source, the Statewide Hazmat Response Team will be released back to their normal work location (Anchorage or Fairbanks). The EPA contractor and the ADEC contractor will continue with periodic air monitoring until the facility owner is able to effect permanent repairs to the ammonia refrigeration system.